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Abstract
We present, MULTIK, a Linux-based framework 1 that
reduces the attack surface for operating system kernels by re-
ducing code bloat. MULTIK “orchestrates” multiple kernels
that are specialized for individual applications in a transparent
manner. This framework is flexible to accommodate differ-
ent kernel code reduction techniques and, most importantly,
run the specialized kernels with near-zero additional runtime
overheads. MULTIK avoids the overheads of virtualization
and runs natively on the system. For instance, an Apache
instance is shown to run on a kernel that has (a) 93.68% of its
code reduced, (b) 19 of 23 known kernel vulnerabilities elimi-
nated and (c) with negligible performance overheads (0.19%).
MULTIK is a framework that can integrate with existing code
reduction and OS security techniques. We demonstrate this by
using D-KUT and S-KUT– two methods to profile and elimi-
nate unwanted kernel code. The whole process is transparent
to the user applications because MULTIK does not require a
recompilation of the application.
1 Introduction
General-purpose operating systems (OSes) have, over time,
bloated in size. While this is necessitated by the need to
support a diverse set of applications and usage scenarios, a
significant amount of the kernel code is typically not required
for any given application. For example, Linux supports more
than 300 system calls and contains code for supporting differ-
ent filesystems, network protocols, hardware drivers, etc. all
of which may not be needed for every application or deploy-
ment. While a minimal off-the-shelf install of Ubuntu 16.04
(running kernel 4.4.1) produces a kernel binary with an 8MB
text section, many of the applications that we profiled (refer
to §6 for more details) only use about 800KB of it.
In addition to performance issues, unused kernel code
(when mapped into an application’s process memory) rep-
resents an attack surface – especially if vulnerabilities exist
in the unused parts of the kernel code. Such vulnerabilities,
while less common than those in applications, are still found
1This concept is generalizable to any operating system that uses paging.
with regular frequency.2 Since OS kernels are often consid-
ered to be a part of the trusted computing base (TCB) for
many systems, this attack surface poses a significant risk. To-
day, there exist many known exploits that take advantage of
kernel vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2017-169953).
Researchers have explored different techniques to reduce
kernel code (e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]). For example, (a) build-
ing application specific unikernels [1], (b) tailoring kernels
through build configuration editing [2, 3], providing special-
ized kernel views for each application [4, 5] among others.
These approaches, either need application level changes [1],
or need expert knowledge about (and manual intervention
in) the selection of configurations – they also sacrifice the
amount of kernel reduction achieved to support multiple appli-
cations [2, 3], or incur significant performance overheads [4]
or can only specialize the kernels at a coarse page level granu-
larity [5]. Note: “granularity”, in this context, refers to sizes
of code chunks that are considered for elimination; some
techniques eliminate kernel code at the page level [5] while
others may choose to do it at a basic block level [4]. We show
that our framework can evaluate systems with different levels
of code reduction granularity (with the obvious result that
with a finer granularity of code reductions, a greater amount
of kernel code can be eliminated (§6.1)).
In this paper we introduce MULTIK (§2), a flexible, au-
tomated, framework for (a) orchestrating multiple kernels
(full or specialized) at (b) user chosen code reduction gran-
ularity and near-zero runtime overheads – without the need
for virtualization. In addition, MULTIK does not introduce
additional overhead if a finer-grain granularity is chosen. To
demonstrate this, we evaluate MULTIK on three levels of
granularity using two specialization tools (§4), (i) D-KUT,
a run-time profiling-based tool that can tailor the Linux ker-
nel at different granularity (we perform basic block- and
function/symbol-granularity tailoring in this paper) and (ii)
S-KUT, a syscall-based tool that tailors the kernel based on
the system calls used by the application. MULTIK is able to
2Over 2500 vulnerabilities have been found in the Linux Kernel since
2010 (https://nvd.nist.gov/).
3https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2017-16995
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simultaneously run multiple applications that either (i) have
their kernels specialized with any one of these tools or (ii)
use the full, unmodified, kernel. Note that, though the two
approaches (D-KUT and S-KUT) are complementary – they
can either be used independently or in conjunction with other
tools/frameworks4.
Figure 1 shows the high-level architecture of our MULTIK
framework. A vanilla kernel is profiled (Stage 1) using the
application that is supposed to run on it. Note that in contrast
to existing approaches, the system designer can choose the
level of granularity and code reduction techniques (Stage 2).
At runtime (Stage 3), the MULTIK framework launches the
application on its specialized kernel (one application per spe-
cialized kernel5). The entire framework executes on a “base”
(vanilla) kernel. The details of each of these stages/compo-
nents are explained in the rest of the paper.
MULTIK imposes very small, almost negligible, runtime
overheads (< 1%) regardless of the granularity chosen (§6).
User programs run unmodified and natively. In fact, the
entire framework is transparent to application developers.
Our framework can also easily integrate with container-based
systems such as Docker 6 (see our experiments in Table 9) –
which are popular for deploying applications.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
1. Design and implement MULTIK (§3), a flexible frame-
work for dispatching multiple kernels (specialized, un-
modified or a combination of both) on the same machine
without the need for virtualization.
2. Build D-KUT (§4.1) and S-KUT (§4.2), tools for spe-
cializing a kernel at fine (instruction-level) and coarse
(system-call level) granularity, respectively.
3. Presents an evaluation for attack surface reduction and
performance overheads; the proposed framework shows
4In fact, MULTIK is not beholden to these tools. System designers
may use their favorite profiling methods/tools. The kernel profiles that are
obtained can be easily integrated with the MULTIK framework.
5Though this can be generalized as explained in §7.
6https://www.docker.com
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Figure 1: High level architecture of MULTIK. Stage 1: an applica-
tion is profiled to identify necessary kernel code using techniques
chosen by developers (this paper presents two such possible tech-
niques: D-KUT and S-KUT). Stage 2: MULTIK reads the informa-
tion for code reduction (based on the kernel profile) generated in
Stage 1. Stage 3: MULTIK creates the customized kernel (based on
kernel profile from in Stage 2) when the application is launched.
virtually no runtime overhead while significantly reduc-
ing the attack surface both in terms of the amount of
eliminated code and CVEs.
We also discuss limitations of MULTIK and also how other
techniques can be adapted to integrate with it (including a
comparative evaluation) in §6 and §7.
2 Background and Design Goals
Kernel specialization for attack surface reduction has been
studied in multiple previous works. Those prior works all
aimed to (i) identify unused parts of a bloated kernel and (ii)
remove the identified parts either statically or disabled them
at runtime. Debloating kernels in this way removes software
vulnerabilities present in unused kernel code, reducing its
attacks surface and thereby contributing to a system’s security.
In the following, we address limitations of existing kernel
attack surface reduction approaches and then set our threat
model and design goals. At the end, we illustrate an overview
of our approach in MULTIK to achieve our design goals.
2.1 Limitations of existing approaches
Complexity in handling Kconfig. One of the prominent
approaches to de-bloating Linux kernel is to use the kernel
build configuration system, kconfig. However, working with
those configurations is a complex job not only because there
are over 300 feature groups and more than 20,000 individ-
ual configuration options to choose from, but also because
most of these options have many dependencies that further
contribute to the complexity of the system. While approaches
to automate kconfig to tailor the Linux kernel have been pro-
posed [2, 3], they often require (manual) maintenance of
whitelist and blacklist configuration options — these lists
quickly become irrelevant as applications and kernel evolve.
Specializing a kernel for running many applications.
When running multiple application on a system, those ap-
proaches [2, 3] tailor the kernel for the combined set of appli-
cations. This negatively affects the attack surface reduction
because the kernel will need to contain code for serving re-
quests from all such applications, and not just for serving
a single application. For instance, orthogonal applications
(e.g., Apache and ImageMagick) only share about 20% of
the kernel code for their usage. Even similar applications
(e.g., Apache and vsftpd) share about 83% of the kernel and
often leave as much as 20% not shared. Hence, there is a high
likelihood that unused code stays in the final kernel.
Use of virtualization and specialization granularity. To
address some of these concerns, the Face-Change system pro-
posed the customization of kernels for each application [4].
However, their system is implemented with a hypervisor com-
ponent, and this makes applications and their kernels run in a
virtual machine (with associated performance penalties). Fur-
ther, due to the use of a VMI-based approach for determining
the appropriate kernel ”view”, Face-Change incurs additional
runtime overheads (about 40% for Apache and around 5−7%
for Unixbench).
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KASR system [5] eliminates the performance overhead
(keeps it within 1%) but still requires applications to run in
virtual machines. Moreover, their kernel specialization is
limited to a coarse page-level granularity that can still allow
unnecessary and potentially vulnerable kernel code to remain
in the system. With MULTIK we aim to overcome some of
these limitations as we discuss in §2.3.
Application kernel profile completeness. A precondition
of using any of these kernel reduction systems is an accurate
and complete profile of the kernel facilities that applications
depend on. If this profile is incomplete, then a benign, uncom-
promised application may try to execute code in the kernel
that is not part of the profile. Unfortunately, executing code
that isn’t in the customized kernel due to an incomplete profile
is indistinguishable from a compromised application trying
to execute code that the original application cannot invoke.
The need for a complete profile is a limitation of all kernel
reduction systems [2, 3, 4, 5], including MULTIK.
2.2 Threat Model
In MULTIK, we assume the following for attackers:
• Local, user-level execution is given without physical
access to the machine. We assume our attackers are
limited to launching local/remote attacks on kernel from
user privilege (i.e., ring 3) without having any physical
access to the machine.
• Firmware, BIOS and processor are trusted. Attacks
on the kernel originating from components at levels
lower than the kernel are out of scope for this paper.
• Hardware devices attached to the machine are
trusted. Similarly, DMA attacks and other attacks
from hardware devices are out of scope.
This threat model covers general kernel exploit scenarios,
i.e., launching an attack from user-level to interfere with
kernel-level execution. For instance, the followings are exam-
ples of valid attacks on MULTIK:
• Privilege escalation attacks from user to kernel.
• Control-flow hijacking attacks (arbitrary code execution)
in kernel.
• Information leaks (arbitrary read) from kernel to user.
• Unauthorized kernel data overwriting (arbitrary write)
originating from user.
2.3 Design Goals
The overarching goal of MULTIK is to reduce the kernel
attack surface of a system by generating a minimal kernel
for running a set of user applications. To achieve this goal,
we aim to build a system that can do this in an efficient
(i.e., no runtime overhead) and transparent (i.e., no applica-
tion changes) manner. We elaborate on the design goals of
MULTIK next.
Flexible and fine-grained attack surface reduction. The
first design goal of MULTIK is to only permit the kernel
code identified as necessary in an application’s profile to run
when the application is running. Some prior work [3] cus-
tomizes kernels at feature granularity, by minimizing build-
time configuration options required for supporting a specific
application (e.g., if access to USB mass storage is not re-
quired, CONFIG_USB_STORAGE can be disabled to exclude code
that deals with interfacing with USB devices). Sometimes
such features are big, and because the feature is its minimal
granularity, it often contains more code than required even
if only parts of features are used by applications. Similarly,
KASR [5] customizes kernels at a page granularity by dynam-
ically removing the executable permission for specific kernel
code pages if the code in those page are not being used by the
application. However, this approach overestimates required
kernel code by including a whole page (4 KB) even if applica-
tion requires only parts of it. In this regard, we aim to design
MULTIK to support granularity down to the basic block level.
We note that in theory, MULTIK can even support byte-level
granularity, but in practice since it would not make sense on
current CPU architectures to permit a subset of instructions
in a basic block to execute without permitting all the instruc-
tions in the basic block to execute, we only evaluate MULTIK
down to the basic block granularity. Further, prior works of-
ten could only customize at a specific granularity (e.g., page
level for KASR [5], feature level for Tailor [3]). Our goal
is to design MULTIK to be a framework that can orchestrate
kernels specialized at different specialization granularity.
Fine-grained security domain for customization. Another
design goal for MULTIK is to customize kernel at a fine-
grained security domain level. A security domain can be a
single process or an instance of a container.
Previous works customized the kernel for a whole system
(i.e., all applications or an application stack running on the
machine) [3] or to run a whole virtual machine [5]. Such cus-
tomized kernels will include the union of kernel code required
by every application running on the machine. Customizing
kernels for all applications together does not minimize the
attack surface as each application will have more kernel code
mapped than is required [4]. As a result, MULTIK aims to
support specialized kernels for each process so that every
specialized kernel has code only necessary for the process.
Efficiency. MULTIK should minimize the performance
overhead. Specifically, we aim to have near-zero (< 1%)
as shown in §6.4 run-time performance overhead and not
interfere with the application execution.
Transparency. MULTIK should not require application
source code, application code instrumentation or application
changes. Further, customized kernels must be compatible
with the target application and should able to support regular
use-cases or workload of the application. To this end, we
design MULTIK to interact only with the kernel space to
maximize compatibility and to support user-level applications
transparently.
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Flexibility in sharing system resources. Some applica-
tions work and interact with each other closely (e.g., Apache
+ git for GitLab and Apache + ImageMagick for MediaWiki).
For such applications MULTIK should allow applications to
interact using system resources (e.g., IPC, locks, etc.) to max-
imize the flexibility in application interactions. Employing
virtual machine based solutions and address space isolation
techniques (SFI [6], XFI [7], etc.), will reduce the flexibil-
ity and ease of such interactions. Ideally, MULTIK should
let normal interactions among applications as if they are all
running on a machine with a single kernel. Running multiple
applications in docker containers on the same machine exem-
plifies this goal. In other words, we would like our design to
provide customized kernels for each application (or docker
container) to strike a balance between the isolation of attack
surfaces and the flexibility (i.e., to allow normal application
interactions).
2.4 Our Approach
MULTIK: Multi-Kernel Orchestration. We present
MULTIK (Figure 2), a kernel runtime that deploys tailored
kernel code for each application. MULTIK customizes the
kernel code before launching an application by consulting the
kernel profile of the target application. Specifically, MULTIK
makes (a) a copy of the entire kernel text to a new physical
memory region, (b) removes the unused parts from this kernel
copy by using the application’s kernel profile and (c) deploys
the application with this tailored kernel. To transparently and
efficiently deploy tailored kernel code for each application,
page table entries for the kernel text are updated. That is,
MULTIK alters virtual-to-physical page mappings to point
the application to the new customized kernel. By doing this,
we can switch automatically the kernel between applications
(with near-zero performance overhead) because the page table
will be switched as part of a context switch.
MULTIK can work with application kernel profiles pro-
duced at different granularities and using different profiling
techniques. We use two specialization techniques (presented
below) to demonstrate and evaluate MULTIK.
D-KUT: Dynamic tracing. D-KUT (Figure 6) is a tool
to identify the kernel code necessary for an application.
We leverage dynamic tracing of the kernel execution while
the system is running the target application with its use
cases. This approach has also been used in previous work
(e.g., [2, 3, 4, 5]). The purpose of this step is to determine
which parts of kernel code to remove before application de-
ployment. In particular, we will remove any code that is not
included in the dynamic execution traces. Our tracer collects
and stores executed parts of the kernel at basic-block granu-
larity (the smallest granularity) to maximize attack surface
reduction. For tracing to be effective and for the customized
kernel to not impact application execution, tracing requires
a good set of use cases that are representative of an applica-
tion’s kernel usage. Previous work (e.g., [3]) has found that
a modest amount of test cases and tracing runs are sufficient
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Figure 2: MULTIK Architecture. This figure depicts the runtime
kernel specialization of MULTIK. When an application is launched,
MULTIK first fetches the application’s kernel profile from the kernel
profile database. Next, MULTIK clones the KERNEL0 as KERNEL0’
and then masks the parts that are not contained in the application’s
kernel profile. As a result, MULTIK creates a customized kernel
for the running application. MULTIK applies this process for all
applications running in the system, and each application runs with
its own customized kernel.
to get good coverage of an application’s kernel profile. Here
we assume that such test cases are supplied by application
developers or deployers (e.g., from unit tests, benchmarks,
workloads etc.). Generating the workloads or test cases is not
in scope for this work because MULTIK does not limit how
the kernel is profiled. Since different applications exercise dif-
ferent parts of the kernel, we need to carry out the tracing for
each application and store them as an application’s kernel pro-
file. This collected kernel profile is used by MULTIK when it
generates a tailored kernel for an application at runtime. Note
that MULTIK works independently of the kernel customiza-
tion technique and can use a kernel profile generated by any
existing or future customization techniques.
S-KUT: Syscall Analysis. S-KUT is an approach to expand
the kernel profile and enhance the reliability. To be more spe-
cific, S-KUT tries to include rarely-triggered exception/ error
handling code while being able to remove a large portion of
the kernel. We use the compiler features to analyze the kernel
source code. By doing this, we can have precise information
of what code should be included. For this approach to be ef-
fective, the deployer has to have a list of system calls that the
application uses by either static (i.e., symbolic execution) or
dynamic methods (i.e., strace). MULTIK does not address
and limit how the list of system calls is generated.
Benefits. An immediate benefit of removing large portions
of unused kernel code is the resulting attack surface reduc-
tion. Vulnerabilities (both known and unknown) present in
the removed code will never exist in the resulting runtime ker-
nels. Our evaluation results show that MULTIK successfully
removes large portions of kernel code (e.g., unused kernel
functions, system calls and loadable kernel modules) from the
application’s memory space. In many instances we achieve
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more than 90% reduction in kernel code, i.e., .text (see Ta-
ble 2 in §6.1) and consequently eliminate many vulnerabilities.
For instance, MULTIK eliminates 19 out of total 23 vulnera-
bilities (listed as CVEs) in Linux Kernel 4.4.1 when tailored
for the Apache web server (see §6.1). Although MULTIK
does not aim to detect and eliminate specific vulnerabilities, it
can reduce the system’s overall risk of compromise and could
serve as one layer of a defense-in-depth [8] strategy.
3 MULTIK: Orchestrating Specialized Ker-
nels
MULTIK is a kernel mechanism to orchestrate customized
kernels efficiently and transparently for each application at
runtime. The goal of MULTIK is to provide each application
access to only kernel code that is customized to that appli-
cation. By doing so, MULTIK will reduce the kernel attack
surface by removing a large part of unused kernel code from
the virtual memory of the application processes.
Overview. Figure 3 illustrates how MULTIK works with
multiple applications running on the system. During the
launch of each application, MULTIK maps the customized
kernel for the application into a new physical memory region.
MULTIK then updates the page table entries (of the kernel
code) for that application process to redirect all further kernel
execution to the customized kernel. This update to the page
table will completely remove the original (full) kernel from
an application’s virtual memory view and switch the view to
the customized one. Additionally, this update will guarantee
that the CPU that runs the application can only work with the
customized kernel code. This is because the process context
switching in the operating system will switch the page table
automatically. Hence virtual addresses in the CPU will only
refer to the customized view of the kernel code.
This approach is promising because once the page table
is updated during application launch (one-time cost), no run-
time intervention is required to switch to the customized
kernel. This will significantly enhance the runtime perfor-
mance. In contrast to this approach, prior work relies on
changing extended page table (EPT) permissions at runtime
(in KASR [5]). This has a limitation of page-level permission
deprivation, or relies on virtual machine introspection (VMI)
to customize page table entries at each context switch (in
FACE-CHANGE [4]). All of which incur nontrivial runtime
performance overheads.
3.1 Challenges
Although our design is conceptually simple, MULTIK must
overcome a few challenges:
Sharing system resources (§3.2): Running multiple applica-
tions in the same system could benefit from resource sharing
among the applications. For instance, processes can com-
municate efficiently via inter-process communication (IPC)
mechanisms available in the system such as locks, signals,
pipes, message queues, shared memory, sockets, etc. and
processes can also share hardware devices attached to the
system. Such sharing is transparent by design as applications
share the same kernel (i.e., code) and share the same ker-
nel memory space (i.e., kernel data). However, running a
customized (a different) kernel per each application could
interfere with such transparent sharing. For instance, running
a customized kernel in a virtual machine requires virtualiz-
ing hardware and shared resources among applications that
introduces compatibility and performance issues. Addition-
ally, having a different memory layout for each application’s
kernel would make the data sharing even harder. For instance,
a data structure prepared in one application cannot be used in
a different application and might even require transformation.
Handling hardware interrupts (§3.3): A hardware inter-
rupt can occur at any time regardless of its customized ker-
nel view. For instance, while running a customized kernel
for a non-networking application (such as gzip), the CPU
could encounter a hardware interrupt from the network inter-
face card (NIC). In such a case, the execution will be redi-
rected to the interrupt handler. If the customized kernel is not
equipped to handle the interrupt, then the system could either
become unstable or important events could be missed. An
easy workaround would be to include all hardware interrupt
handlers in the customized kernel, as FACE-CHANGE [4]
does. However, such an approach will increase the kernel
attack surface by adding unnecessary kernel code for an ap-
plication that doesn’t need access to particular hardware.
3.2 Deploying Customized Kernels
When deploying customized kernels in MULTIK, applications
should only have a view of the kernel customized for them.
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At the same time, we would like to ensure that customized
kernels running in one system could share system resources,
e.g., share the memory space, available IPC mechanisms
etc. To achieve these goals in a manner transparent to the
application, we update an application’s page table entirely
(corresponding to kernel text) to point to the customized
kernel and we do this when launching the application (i.e., at
execve()).
Deploying the customized kernel by updating kernel text
page table entries gives us the following benefits. First, shar-
ing system resource among multiple kernels becomes straight
forward. Each application shares the kernel data memory
space because we only alter the page table entries for kernel
text. Sharing system resources via shared memory, direct
memory access, or sharing kernel data structures is transpar-
ent. Second, loading and switching between kernels is simple
and efficient. Loading a custom kernel will only incur the
costs for mapping of new code section and updating page
table entries, which is simple to do as part of the execve
system call. Additionally, switching between the kernels is
simple because a typical context switch involves changing
the current page table pointer (CR3 register in x86) to that of
the newly scheduled application, and this will automatically
switch the kernel text too. In short, the goal of providing ap-
plications access to only customized kernel code will be met
in a transparent manner. Therefore, MULTIK always isolates
the application’s kernel view to the one customized for it.
Figure 4 (from 1 to 4 ) shows how MULTIK switches
the page table entries during application launch. To intercept
the launching of an application ( 1 ), MULTIK places a hook
in the execve system call and maps the customized kernel
in that hook ( 2 ). In particular, MULTIK allocates a new
physical memory region and copies customized kernel code
to that region ( 3 ). Customized kernel code could either be
generated on the fly using a pre-learned kernel profile for the
application or could be pre-generated and stored to reduce
application launch overhead. We follow the former approach
since it only incurs a small one-time launch delay of 3ms.
Next, MULTIK updates the application’s page table entries
for kernel text to point to this new physical memory region
( 4 ). After this point, the application can only access the
customized kernel text because the original full kernel image
will never exist in its virtual memory space. Then, MULTIK
gives control back to the execve system call to handle the
loading and linking of the user space, and finally, we let the
execution continue in the user space.
The deployment of the customized kernel and the appli-
cation is finished at this stage because kernel switching for
each application will be handled automatically by the regular
context switching mechanism as previously discussed. For
instance, Figure 3 shows a case of three applications, Apache,
Php-Fpm and MySQL running in a MULTIK system. When a
processor (CPU) runs Apache in the userspace, because this
application’s page table maps kernel code to the kernel cus-
tomized for Apache, the CPU can interact only with the cus-
tomized kernel and cannot access the original full kernel code.
When a context switch happens, say, switching to php-fpm,
the regular context switching mechanism will change the
value of CR3 register to the page table of php-fpm. By design,
the page table for php-fpm will redirect all accesses to kernel
code to the kernel customized for php-fpm. No matter how a
context switch happens in the system, MULTIK ensures that
an application can only have a view of kernel code that is
customized for it, thus reducing the potential kernel attack
surface available to any application.
Sharing system resources. We design MULTIK to allow
sharing of system resources such as hardware devices, ker-
nel data structures (e.g., task struct, etc.), inter-process com-
munication (IPC) mechanisms (i.e., pipes, UNIX domain
sockets, mutexes), shared memory, etc.– to maximize a sys-
tem’s flexibility and compatibility. More specifically, we
design MULTIK to work with existing container mechanisms
(such as Docker) and this requires the sharing of system re-
sources while running customized kernels for each container.
MULTIK achieves this by i) fully sharing kernel data among
customized kernels and ii) having the same memory layout
for all customized kernel text.
First, kernel data and its memory space can be shared as
is because MULTIK does not modify any of it. In particular,
any resource sharing that does not involve any kernel text
(such as passing of kernel data structures or device access via
DMA) would not be affected by the deployment of MULTIK.
However, resource sharing that involves kernel text, for in-
stance, a data structure that refers to the kernel functions such
as function pointers (e.g., file operations), would be affected
if any of the customized kernel does have a different memory
layout. To resolve this issue, MULTIK requires customized
kernels to have the same memory layout as the original kernel.
That is, a customized kernel will be mapped at exactly the
same virtual address space as that of the original kernel but
the customized kernel text (code) will mask parts of the kernel
not required by that specific application. Although this ap-
proach would create some memory overheads ( 8MB for each
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each customized kernel, and then 3) this handler will defer this inter-
rupt (to ksoftirqd by storing a softirq vector. 4) Later, ksoftirqd
will look at the vector and handle the bottom-half of the interrupt.
customized kernel), this allows MULTIK to enable sharing of
function pointers among multiple customized kernels. As we
see (§6.4.1) this memory overhead does not limit how many
applications we can run in parallel in practice.
3.3 Handling Hardware Interrupts
To handle hardware interrupts we exploit deferred interrupt
handling [9] to keep the customized kernels small. Hard-
ware interrupts are problematic for customized kernels if the
corresponding handler does not exist in the customized ker-
nel. Because hardware interrupts caused by the system could
be delivered at any time, even an application that does not
utilize any of the associated hardware could receive the hard-
ware interrupt requests. Missing hardware interrupt handlers
in customized kernels will cause such interrupt requests to
fail and the failure to handle such interrupts could make the
system unstable. One way to work around this issue is to in-
clude all interrupt handling routines in all customized kernels.
However, such an approach would unnecessarily increase the
potential attack surface of customized kernels.
Figure 5 illustrates we handle such interrupts in our frame-
work. MULTIK includes only the top-half hardware interrupt
handlers that are compiled into the kernel by whiltelisting (in
all customized kernels). The top-half handlers are smaller
because their job is to transform a hardware interrupt request
into a software interrupt request (softirq). Consequently, our
customized kernels only deal with the top-half of any hard-
ware interrupt and delegate the actual handling of interrupts to
the kernel threads run by ksoftirqd. Hence, when hardware
interrupts (e.g., timer, network or block device interrupts)
arrive, our customized kernel will run the top-half handler
to store a softirq vector to delegate the interrupt handling
to ksoftirqd. The bottom-half of the interrupt will then be
handled by ksoftirqd when it runs.
KERNEL0. To handle the bottom-half of the interrupts,
we run ksoftirqd on a general purpose regular kernel (that
includes all parts that the system requires), that we refer
to as KERNEL0. An example of KERNEL0 is a kernel in
a distribution’s package without any customization such
as linux-image-4.15.0-39-generic in Ubuntu 18.04 LTS.
This kernel not only handles hardware interrupts but also
takes care of system-wide events such as booting, shutdown,
etc. KERNEL0 also serves as a baseline template for kernel
customization because it contains the entire kernel code re-
quired by the system. In MULTIK, customized application
kernels are generated by cloning the kernel .text region of
KERNEL0 and masking parts of the kernel that are not needed
by the application based on the application’s kernel profile.
4 Generating Application Kernel Profiles
Application kernel profiles identify which parts of the kernel
code are used by an application and which parts are not. We
use ’granularity’ as a unit to quantify the precision of the
specialization profiles. The following granularity levels are
used in the paper: (i) Basic block level: Basic block is a set
of instructions that are always executed as a unit without any
jumps or branches in between. The CPU either executes all
the instructions in the basic block or executes none. This
makes it one of the most precise levels of specialization [4].
(ii) Symbol level: Kernel interfaces are exported as symbols
using EXPORT_SYMBOL(). At this level of granularity all the
instructions that make up the interface are included in the pro-
file even if only certain code paths of the interface are actually
being used. (iii) System call level: Given that syscalls are the
main interface through which user space applications interact
with the kernel, we can enumerate the syscalls that are used
by the application and eliminate those that aren’t [10, 11]. (iv)
Page level: When a binary is loaded into memory, the (mem-
ory) smallest unit that can be referred to is a page (4 KB or
more). Tracing methods that track instruction that are being
executed in the memory can only do so on a page level [5].
This will result in an entire page of instructions being in-
cluded in the profile even if only a single instruction was run
from that page. (v) Feature level: The kernel configuration
system, kconfig, determines kernel features that need to be
built into the kernel based on the state of certain configura-
tion options. With this code can be included or eliminated
only at a feature level, producing a much coarser and was
used in [3]. MULTIK is flexible enough to use application
kernel profiles created using different profiling granularities
in order to deploy customized kernels. We present and evalu-
ate one trace-based (D-KUT) and one syscall-based approach
(S-KUT) to demonstrate application kernel profile generation.
4.1 D-KUT: Dynamic Instruction Tracing
D-KUT (see Figure 6) profiles the kernel at a basic-block
level granularity. This is in contrast to KASR [5], a recently
proposed approach for specializing the Linux kernel binary,
that profiles the kernel usage of applications at page level
(4KB default page size) granularity. When profiled at page
level granularity, unused instructions present in the neigh-
borhood of used instructions within the 4KB range also get
included in the final in-memory kernel binary.
Tracing setup. We use QEMU[12], a full system emulator
to run the user application along with the vanilla kernel we
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Figure 6: D-KUT Architecture. This figure depicts the offline
per-application kernel tracing. While running each application with
test-cases that represents application’s use cases for kernel, MULTIK
trace the kernel and store the information for executed basic blocks
during the tracing into kernel profile database.
need to trace. With QEMU we trace every instruction that the
systems executes using the program counter (pc) register by
utilizing the exec tb block. This basically helps us capture
the addresses of instructions that are being executed.
Segmentation. The trace from above includes instructions
from (1) System boot (2) Applications Runs and (3) System
shutdown. The instructions from (1) and (3) are clearly not
required by the application. To separate this out from the trace
we use the mmap syscall to taint/touch a specific memory
address right before the application is run and right after the
application is terminated. This helps us mark the start and
end of our application and helps filter out the boot/shutdown
instructions from the traces.
Background processes / daemons. During a typical ker-
nel boot it starts a bunch of background processes/daemons
that provide useful services. These processes are always run-
ning with the application process. They can add noise to the
traces that we obtain. To filter these out we use a custom init
script that only starts daemons required by the application
we are interested in. This eliminates noise from unnecessary
background processes in the traces.
Invariants in execution. Kernel behavior is not determin-
istic when running an application. Execution paths in the
kernel could change because not all values are invariants (e.g.,
network conditions, CPU frequencies and time). Besides,
QEMU drops trace events occasionally due to the full buffer.
Therefore to capture all the possible code paths a kernel might
take for a given application, we repeat the tracing process
multiple times. In our experiments we observed that it takes
between 10 to 15 runs before the code paths stabilize and the
trace can be used with confidence as no new code paths are
Table 1: Source lines of code (SLOC) of the components of
MULTIK and D-KUT.
Component Lines of code
D-KUT- QEMU 3 LoC of C
D-KUT- Scripts 272 LoC of Python
S-KUT- Make 1 LoC of Makefile
S-KUT- Scripts 26 LoC of Python
S-KUT- Scripts 96 LoC of Golang
MULTIK- Linux Kernel 4.4.1 477 LoC of C
added for a given set of input. This need for multiple trace
runs has also been reported in prior work [3, 5].
Granularity. QEMU produces a trace with basic block level
granularity. We can post-process basic-block level traces to
obtain symbol-level trace by including the entire symbol cor-
responding to each of the blocks. Symbol-level trace requires
less number of runs because the post-processing makes the
trace more inclusive. In our experiments we observe that
even at this symbol granularity the trace obtained is much
smaller than the ones produced by a page level trace used by
KASR [5], see Table 2.
Compatibility with other specialization techniques.
D-KUT only requires the final bootable kernel binary to pro-
duce a trace. Thus a kernel produced as a result of any other
specialization technique can be further specialized with our
tool. Thus D-KUT can complement and take advantage of
other profiling techniques.
4.2 S-KUT: Syscall Analysis
S-KUT is a syscall-based analysis technique to increase the
reliability of the application kernel profile. We track all possi-
ble functions that a system call can use for all such calls made
by an application. This list of functions is built by analyzing
the register transfer language (RTL) dumped by GCC when
compiling the kernel with -fdump-rtl-expand. We obtain
the approximate list of system calls that an application issues
by using strace to intercept and record all system calls made
in that execution context. This approach does not guarantee
a complete list of system calls if some system calls are not
triggered during tracing. We then expand the application pro-
file by combining functions called by possible system calls
with the original profile. In our experiments, by using this
technique, we increase the coverage of the profile generated
by D-KUT at symbol granularity. The result in §6.1 shows
that more than 82% of the kernel can be reduced and 73%
of the CVEs are mitigated when including functions used by
system calls in the profile.
5 Implementation
We implement MULTIK on Linux 4.4.1 7 running on Intel
Core i7-8086K (4.00 GHz) CPU. We use the procfs interface
to provide an application identifier and the corresponding
application kernel profile to the respective application. We
7 We choose an older kernel to demonstrate MULTIK’s capability in
reducing vulnerabilities by listing affected CVEs. Note that MULTIK can be
applied to the newest kernels as well to remove potential vulnerabilities.
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generate application kernel profiles in an offline step using
D-KUT and S-KUT tools (see §4). We hook the execve
syscall so that when it is invoked to launch an application
(that has a corresponding application kernel profile) we gen-
erate and deploy a specialized kernel as described in §3. Ta-
ble 1 lists the total amount of code for MULTIK. We built
MULTIK with 477 lines of C, D-KUT with 275 lines of code
and S-KUT with 123 lines of code.
Our customized kernels are masked in a special manner
– by overwriting them with a special one-byte instruction
sequence 0xcc (instruction int3). This acts a fall-back mech-
anism for detecting (and reporting) when an application tries
to execute code not available in its customized kernel. We
choose int3 not only because this instruction could raise a
software interrupt (that our kernel can intercept to thwart unex-
pected execution) but also because it is a one-byte instruction
whose semantics cannot be changed by arbitrary code exe-
cution resulting from attacks. Note that other techniques[4],
overwrite the kernel binary with a sequence of UD2 (two-byte)
instructions, 0x0f 0x0b. This opcode can be misinterpreted
by reading it as 0x0b 0x0f. In such cases, it would not raise
an interrupt. On the other hand, using the int3 instruction, we
can detect unexpected execution in a more reliable fashion.
For instance, consider a simple case when an application’s
requested kernel execution hits a masked function or masked
basic blocks (e.g., a branch not taken or a system call not
used during the tracing). In such cases, the execution will hit
the int3 instruction immediately. The kernel knows that the
code pointed to (by the instruction pointer for the software
interrupt) is missing. At that point, one can choose to kill the
process or follow other strategies8.
6 Evaluation
We evaluated MULTIK to answer the following questions:
• How much attack surface can MULTIK reduce (§6.1)?
• How effective is MULTIK at eliminating CVEs (§6.2)?
• How long does it take to generate a kernel profile for an
application (§6.3)?
• What is the effect of MULTIK on the system’s runtime
performance (§6.4)?
Evaluation setup. We specialize application kernels at three
different granularity: (a) block and (b) symbol (both with
D-KUT) and (c) syscall (with S-KUT) (§4). We refer block,
symbol and syscall granularity to B, S, and SC, respectively,
in the rest of the paper. We performed all experiments in a
KVM virtual machine with 2 vcpus and 8G RAM running
on Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8086K CPU @ 4.00GHz. Note that
we use KVM for the convenience of testing, and MULTIK
does not requires a virtual machine to run specialized kernels.
For specializing kernels to applications, we choose Apache,
STREAM, perf, Redis, and Gzip.
8Depends on the policies picked by the system designer.
6.1 Attack Surface Reduction
We first tackle the question of how much kernel attack surface
MULTIK can reduce. We do this by measuring how much
kernel text (code) is reduced by specialization. Table 2 shows
the percentage of kernel text reduction w.r.t. the vanilla kernel,
and B, S, and SC indicate the granularity of specialization.
The first row shows the percentage of reduced kernel code.
The reduction for each application is depending on the ap-
plication’s kernel usage. With the block level granularity,
MULTIK can reduce 93.68% of the kernel text from Apache
(I/O intensive) and 97.79% of the kernel text from STREAM
More than 82% of the kernel text can still be removed even
when the granularity is coarse such as symbol and syscall.
Our work outperforms KASR [5] and Tailor [3], which can
reduce 64% and 54% of kernel code respectively. The second
and third rows present the fully and partially removed kernel
functions respectively. Because a block is smaller than a
function body, we remove parts of functions. With block
granularity, more then 99% of the text is excluded.
We observed that the implementation of all system calls
in the Linux kernel 9 only takes up 14% of the text. Restrict-
ing access to system calls (e.g., AppArmor [10], seccomp-
bpf [13]) would (a) not remove any code (leaving the kernels
vulnerable) and (b) have a lesser impact than the techniques
discussed in this paper. This shows the limitations of only
focusing on the whitelisting of system calls.
6.2 CVE Case-Study
We analyze all CVEs present in Linux 4.4.1 by looking at
the patch for each one and detecting which functions are
vulnerable. The kernel is compiled with configuration 4.4.0-
87-generic. A number of vulnerabilities are excluded because
they are not present in the kernel binary since they target
loadable kernel modules and we do not load modules. We
find that 23 of 72 CVEs exist in the kernel binary. A CVE
might involve multiple functions.
We separate the results into three categories to indicate the
different levels of mitigation: (1) V refers to the case where
all functions associated with a vulnerability are removed (2)
P refers to case where some functions associated with a vul-
nerability are removed, and (3) E refers to case where no
functions associated with a vulnerability are removed. Ta-
ble 3 shows the result of each of the CVEs. On average, 20.3
(out of 23) CVEs are mitigated for both block and symbol
granularity on average and 17 out of 23 CVEs are mitigated
for the system-call granularity.
If a CVE is located in a popular code path, it is more likely
that an application exercises it during the offline profiling
phrase. Therefore, such CVEs (i.e., CVE-2017-17053 and
CVE-2016-0723) are likely to remain for all applications. In
other words, if a CVE (e.g., CVE-2018-11508 and CVE-2017-
15129) is on a unpopular code path, there is a good chance
to remove it. 1 is an example of a CVE that we remove
the vulnerability by partically removing one of the function
9We count all functions called by system call entry functions.
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Table 2: Attack Surface Reduction in comparison with the Vanilla Kernel. Text refers to eliminated kernel executable text. Full and partial
symbol refer to kernel functions that are fully and partially eliminated respectively. B, S refer to kernel profiles generated by D-KUT with
basic-block and symbol granularities respectively. SC refers to kernel profiles generated by S-KUT.
Specialized Kernel Apache-B Apache-S Apache-SC STREAM-B STREAM-S STREAM-SC perf-B perf-S perf-SC
Text (code) 93.68% 88.88% 82.25% 97.79% 95.16% 87.64% 96.33% 93.46% 86.57%
Full Symbol 91.87% 91.95% 85.78% 96.65% 96.67% 89.50% 94.78% 94.85% 88.46%
Partial Symbol 99.78% 91.95% 85.78% 99.93% 96.67% 89.50% 99.84% 94.85% 88.46%
Table 3: List of CVEs tested in our security evaluation. Category numbers are referring to: V: the entire vulnerability is removed, P: parts of
vulnerability is removed, E: vulnerability still exists. Effects are referring to: DoS: denial-of-service, Leak: information leak, Priv: privilege
escalation. B, S refer to kernel profiles generated by D-KUT with basic-block and symbol granularities respectively. SC refers to kernel
profiles generated by S-KUT.
CVE Number Description Effect Apache STREAM perfS B SC S B SC S B SC
CVE-2018-11508 An information leak in compat_get_timex() Leak V V V V V V V V V
CVE-2018-10881 An out-of-bound access in ext4_get_group_info() DoS V V V V V V V V V
CVE-2018-10880 A stack-out-of-bounds write in ext4_update_inline_data() DoS V V V V V V V V V
CVE-2018-10879 A use-after-free bug in ext4_xattr_set_entry() DoS V V V V V V V V V
CVE-2018-10675 A use-after-free bug in do_get_mempolicy() DoS V V V V V V V V V
CVE-2018-7480 A double-free bug in blkcg_init_queue() DoS V V V V V V V V V
CVE-2018-6927 An integer overflow bug in futex_requeue() DoS E E E V V E V V V
CVE-2018-1120 A flaw in proc_pid_cmdline_read() DoS V V V V V V V V V
CVE-2017-18270 A flaw in key_alloc() DoS V V E V V E V V E
CVE-2017-18255 An integer overflow in perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler() DoS V V V V V V V V V
CVE-2017-18208 A flaw in madvise_willneed() DoS V V V V V V V V V
CVE-2017-18203 A race condition between dm_get_from_kobject() and
__dm_destory()
DoS V V V V V V V V V
CVE-2017-18174 A double free in pinctl_unregister() called by amd_gpi_remove() DoS V V V V V V V V V
CVE-2017-18079 A null pointer deference in i8042_interrupt(), i8042_start(), and
i8042_stop()
DoS V V V V V V V V V
CVE-2017-17807 Lack of permission check in request_key_and_link() and
construct_get_dest_keyring()
Priv V V E V V E V V E
CVE-2017-17806 Lack of validation in hmac_create() and shash_no_set_key() DoS V V V V V V V V V
CVE-2017-17053 A use-after-free bug in init_new_context() DoS E E E V V E E E E
CVE-2017-17052 A use-after-free bug in mm_init() DoS E E E V V E E E E
CVE-2017-15129 A use-after-free bug in get_net_ns_by_id() DoS V V V V V V V V V
CVE-2017-2618 Lack of input check in selinux_setprocattr() DoS V V V V V V V V V
CVE-2016-0723 A use-after-free in tty_ioctl() DoS E E E E E E E E E
CVE-2015-8709 A flaw in ptrace_has_cap() and __ptrace_may_access() Priv P P P V V V V V V
CVE-2015-5327 A out-of-bound access in x509_decode_time() DoS V V V V V V V V V
required to form an exploit chain. The vulnerability is about
that attackers can create a malicious user namespace and
wait for a root process to enter ptrace_has_cap() to gain the
root privilege. To exploit the CVE, the attackers need two
functions, ptrace_has_cap() and __ptrace_may_access().
Hence, removing one of these functions can mitigate this
CVE.
1 static int
2 ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode) {
3 //...
4 return has_ns_capability(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
5 }
6 static int
7 __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) {
8 //...
9 if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
10 goto ok;
11 //...
12 }
Listing 1: In CVE-2015-8709, __ptrace_may_access() calls
ptrace_has_cap() to check if the process has the capability to ac-
cess an user namespace. The code is simplified.
We elaborate each category using a CVE for the Apache
web server as an example with B(Block) granularity.
1. V, the vulnerability is entirely removed. CVE-2017-
17807 is a vulnerability resulting from an omitted access-
control check when adding a key to the current task’s de-
fault request-keyring via the system call, request_key().
Two functions, construct_key_and_link() and
construct_get_dest_keyring(), are required to
realize the vulnerability. Therefore, since both are
eliminated, attackers have no way to form the chain in
order to exploit this CVE.
2. P, the vulnerability chain is partially removed. CVE-
2015-8709, depicted in 1, is a flaw that can al-
low for a privilege escalation. Invoking both func-
tions form the exploit chain: ptrace_has_cap() and
__ptrace_may_access(). Because our kenrel spe-
cialization partially removes one of the functions
(ptrace_has_cap()), Attackers will no longer be able to
exploit this CVE.
3. E, the vulnerability chain remains. CVE-2017-17052
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allows attackers to achieve a ‘use-after-free’ because
the function mm_init() does not null out the member
->exe_file of a new process’s mm_struct. Attackers can
exploit this as none of the functions have been removed.
6.3 Offline Profile Generation Performance
We trace applications for 10 iterations for symbol granularity
and 15 for block granularity because we observed that the
workload tended to be stable after this many of iterations.
The profiling time depends on how long the workload runs.
Table 4 shows the time needed to profile each of the applica-
tions. The time needed for profiling depends the workload. If
the workload (STREAM[14] in Table 4) only takes a short
amount of time to finish, the profiling will be quick and vice
versa (Apache and perf in Table 4).
Table 4: Time to complete tracing in seconds. Symbol and Block
refers to D-KUT granularity, symbol and basic-block respectively.
Benchmarks Symbol Block
Apache 1714.26 2492
STREAM 146.77 411.98
perf 2139.22 2965.15
6.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section we evaluate (i) application performance by
the Apache web server benchmark, (ii) context-switches by
perf10 and (iii) memory bandwidth with STREAM[14]. All
the experiments were performed in a KVM virtual machine
with 2 vcpus and 8G RAM running on Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-8086K CPU @ 4.00GHz. Positive % indicates improve-
ments, and negative % indicates degradation of the applica-
tion performance. Positive % indicates improvements, and
negative % indicates degradation. We evaluate the perfor-
mance with application benchmarks such as Apache web
server, STREAM [14], a memory microbenchmark, and perf,
a scheduling microbenchmark. Due to the page limits, we
place some of the benchmark results in Appendix §A.2 in-
cluding Redis and Gzip with D-KUT at symbol and block
granularity, since the results are similar.
Apache Web Server. We ran the Apache web server, ver-
sion 2.4.25, on a specialized kernel and the client program
on KERNEL0. The client program Apache benchmark sends
100,000 requests in total with 100 clients concurrently. Ta-
ble 5 shows that the Apache web server running on specialized
kernels (regardless of the trace granularity) has a very simi-
lar performance, in terms of number of requests served per
second, compared to when running on a vanilla kernel. The
performance is within 0.6% of the baseline.
STREAM. We evaluate the memory performance with
STREAM, version 5.10. STREAM has four metrics in-
cluding copy, scale, add and triad. They refer to
the corresponding kernel vector operations. Copy refers
to a[i] = b[i]. Scale refers to a[i] = const*b[i].
Add refers to a[i] = b[i]+c[i]. Triad refers to
10We run the perf command: perf bench sched all.
a[i] = b[i]+const*c[i]. Copy and scale take two memory
accesses while add and triad take three. Table 6 shows that
STREAM running on specialized kernels regardless of the
granularity have close performance compared to the baseline
and the difference is less than 0.5% for all operations.
Perf. We evaluate context switch overheads with the perf
scheduling benchmark that is composed of a messaging mi-
crobenchmark and a piping microbenchmark. The messag-
ing microbenchmark has 200 senders that dispatch messages
through sockets to 200 receivers concurrently. The Piping mi-
crobenchmark has 1 sender and 1 receiver processes executing
1,000,000 pipe operations. Table 7 shows that perf running
on specialized kernels (regardless of the trace granularity)
takes the same amount of time to complete the message and
pipe tasks when compared to running on vanilla (unmodified)
kernels. The performance difference for both message and
pipe tasks is less than 0.6%.
6.4.1 Memory Effect
Every specialized kernel takes up approximately 8MB of ad-
ditional memory space . Kernel memory is not swappable.
Therefore, the system-wide memory pressure will increase
if we keep creating new specialized kernels. We evaluate
the memory pressure by measuring the memory bandwidth
with STREAM [14] benchmark Under a higher memory pres-
sure, the system will swap memory pages in and out more
frequently and results in a lower memory bandwidth. We
run STREAM together with multiple specialized kernels on
a KVM virtual machine with 2 vcpus and 8GB running on
Intel(R)Core(TM) i7-8086K CPU @ 4.00GHz. Swappiness
is a kernel parameter ranging from 0 to 100, which controls
the degree of swapping. The higher the value is, the more
frequently virtual memory swaps. We conduct the experiment
with default value, 60. In order to exclude the factor of the
CPU (i.e., busy CPUs cause slower memory bandwidth),
we run the command sleep on specialized kernels. Figure 7
shows that memory operations start to slow down due to more
frequent memory swaps when there are more than 750 coex-
isting kernels. To be more specific, operations Add and Triad
take twice the memory accesses than the others so the time
that they need to finish is twice longer. We also evaluated the
memory effect on a machine with 4G RAM running on In-
tel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E3-1270 v6 @ 3.80GHz. In this case the
impact is observed after 345 coexisting specialized kernels
(refer to §A.3). The results indicate that memory overhead is
Table 5: Processed HTTP requests per second when running Apache
web server with and without (vanilla) MULTIK. B, S refer to
kernel profiles generated by D-KUT with basic-block and symbol
granularities respectively. SC refers to kernel profiles generated
by S-KUT. Green cells → better performance (more requests per
second). Red cells→ worse performance (less requests per second).
Req/Sec
Apache-Vanilla 23401.07 0.00 %
Apache-B 23337.53 -0.27%
Apache-S 23445.03 +0.19%
Apache-SC 23536.31 +0.58%
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Table 6: Average time to complete different kernel vector operations in seconds. Copy refers to a[i] = b[i]. Scale refers to
a[i] = const*b[i]. Add refers to a[i] = b[i]+c[i]. Triad refers to a[i] = b[i]+const*c[i]. B, S refer to kernel profiles gener-
ated by D-KUT with basic-block and symbol granularities respectively. SC refers to kernel profiles generated by S-KUT. Green cells→ better
performance (shorter time to finish an operation). Red cells→ worse performance (shorter time to finish an operation).
Operation Copy Scale Add Triad
STREAM-Vanilla 0.008192 0.00% 0.008632 0.00% 0.011207 0.00% 0.011428 0.00%
STREAM-B 0.008201 -0.11% 0.008623 +0.10% 0.011237 -0.27% 0.011445 -0.15%
STREAM-S 0.008199 -0.09% 0.008628 +0.05% 0.011201 +0.05% 0.011418 +0.09%
STREAM-SC 0.008178 +0.17% 0.008597 +0.41% 0.011179 +0.25% 0.011406 +0.19%
not an issue for most practical deployments.
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Figure 7: STREAM benchmark with multiple coexisting kernels.
7 Discussion
Kernel Specialization for Containers. The method of
MULTIK for dispatching multiple kernels can seamlessly as-
sign and run a specialized kernel for each security domain,
i.e., container, such as Docker. This is done by sharing a
specialized kernel for multiple applications. In particular, we
can configure MULTIK to have one specialized kernel for set
of applications (running in a container) by profiling kernel
traces while running all such application together. In our
experiment, we integrated MULTIK with Docker containers
trivially, and show that MULTIK affects Docker containers’
performance by less than 1% in §A.1. This approach can also
reduce the memory usage by using fewer kernels. It aligns
well with cloud deployment patterns where containers from
Table 7: Time to complete each microbenchmark in seconds. Mes-
sage refers to concurrent sender/receiver microbenchmark. Pipe→
sequential piping between two process. B, S refer to kernel profiles
generated by D-KUT with basic-block and symbol granularities re-
spectively. SC refers to kernel profiles generated by S-KUT. Green
cells→ better performance (shorter time to finish benchmark). Red
cells→ worse performance (shorter time to finish benchmark).
Benchmark Message Pipe
perf-Vanilla 0.190 0.00% 10.37 0.00%
perf-B 0.191 -0.53% 10.36 +0.10%
perf-S 0.189 +0.53% 10.35 +0.19%
perf-SC 0.190 0.00% 10.38 -0.10%
different organizations may share the same hardware.
Kernel Page-Table Isolation. Kernel page-table isolation
(KPTI) [15] is a feature that mitigates the Meltdown [16]
security vulnerability. KPTI uses two page tables for user and
kernel modes respectively so that user-mode applications can
only access a limited range of kernel memory space such as
entry/exit functions and interrupt descriptors. Although KPTI
hides the kernel from the user space, it does not mitigate the
vulnerabilities because attackers can still call system calls
with carefully crafted parameters to enter the kernel mode
and exploit the system.
Kernel CFI. MULTIK is orthogonal to other kernel attack
surface reduction techniques such as control-flow integrity
(CFI) [17] and can work with them concurrently. Kernel
CFI can indirectly achieve attack surface reductions by re-
stricting available call/jump targets from a large number of
control-flow transfer points (that would otherwise serve as
attack surfaces). Such an approach is orthogonal to MULTIK
and, in fact, they can both complement each other. In partic-
ular, MULTIK can run a kernel reinforced with KCFI, and
MULTIK can further trim such a kernel to achieve an overall
better attack surface reduction. The reason that MULTIK can
be seamlessly combined with such techniques is due to the
fact that it incurs extremely low performance overheads.
AppArmor and SELinux. AppArmor [10] and SELinux 11
are Linux security modules [11] which try to achieve Manda-
tory Access Control. In particular, after identifying the neces-
sary resources and capabilities, both approaches apply a pro-
file to enable/disable them via white/blacklisting. The draw-
backs of AppArmor and SELinux (compared to MULTIK)
is that they only remove access to syscalls that are an entry
point to a certain code path by limiting the POSIX capabilities.
The code is still available to the attacker if she can bypass 12
this protection. In MULTIK we explicitly remove code paths
that are not required by the application, thus preventing the
attacker from accessing it altogether even if other security
measures are compromised. In addition to that, MULTIK can
further reduce code within a system call if we apply smaller
specialization granularity than a symbol, e.g., basic-block
granularity.
Arbitrary Kernel Execution. If an attacker is able to exe-
cute arbitrary code within the kernel space, e.g., by inserting
kernel modules, then the attacker can modify the page ta-
11https://www.nsa.gov/What-We-Do/Research/SELinux
12https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6507
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bles for applications and bypass the kernel view imposed by
MULTIK. We prohibit kernel module insertion for special-
ized kernels. If a kernel module is needed, it can be inserted
from KERNEL0 and it is visible to all specialized kernels.
Kernel Data-Only Attacks. As the underlying kernel data
structures are shared among all the multiplexed customized
kernels, MULTIK alone cannot prevent kernel data corruption
attacks (e.g., [18, 19, 20, 21]) although it can make it harder
for attackers to exploit. However it can be integrated with
existing kernel data protection mechanisms (e.g., [19]) to
improve the overall security of the system.
8 Related Work
In this section we discuss and compare different kernel reduc-
tion approaches. They can be broadly classified into (i) con-
figuration based specialization, (ii) compiler based specializa-
tion, (iii) binary specialization, or (iv) kernel re-architecture.
Configuration based specialization. The Linux kernel
provides the kconfig mechanism for configuring the kernel.
However, the complexity of kconfig makes it hard to tailor
a kernel configuration for a given application. Kurmus et al.
[3] tried to automate kconfig based kernel customization by
obtaining a runtime kernel trace for a target application, then
mapping the trace back to the source lines and using source
lines along with configuration dependencies for arriving at
an optimal configuration. While they were able to achieve
50-80% reduction in kernel size, their approach still requires
some manual effort for creating predefined blacklists and
whitelists of configurations [22]. Further, when multiple ap-
plications need to be run, their approach creates a customized
kernel for all of the applications together thereby limiting
the effectiveness of the attack surface reduction achieved [4].
More recently, LightVM [23] tries to address bloat in the
kernel by implementing a tool called TinyX that starts from
Linux’s tinyconfig and iteratively adds options from a big-
ger set of configuration options. This involves maintaining
a manually produced white-list or black-list. In MULTIK,
everything is automated and requires no manual intervention.
The Linux kernel tinification project [24] focuses on re-
ducing the size of the kernel by making every core kernel
feature configurable, thereby allowing developers to build
just the minimum set of features required to run on embedded
devices. Although configuration-based specialization can be
effective, it remains a manual and tedious process. MULTIK
completely circumvents the configuration process and special-
izes the kernel binary directly. We are also able to produce a
more fine grained reduction compared to the coarse grained
reduction produced by configuration specialization [3].
Compiler based specialization. Modern compilers are
much better at code optimization than humans are. A series
of LWN.net articles [25, 26, 27, 28] discusses various cutting
edge efforts in compiler and link-time techniques that are
being developed in the Linux community that can eliminate
significant amount of dead code and perform various other
code optimizations. Most of the work in this area is exper-
imental and does not produce a working kernel yet. They
exist as out-of-tree patches [29]. The main challenge in ap-
plying these techniques to the Linux kernel arises out of the
complexities in the kernel itself. Handwritten assembly, non-
contiguous layout of functions, etc. do not make the kernel a
good candidate for compiler-based optimization/specializa-
tion as is. It requires manually going through pieces of code
and making careful changes without causing unexpected side
effects. The LLVM community in recent years has produced a
suite of advanced compiler tools [30]. The Linux community
hasn’t been able to take advantage of these due to its tight
coupling with the gcc toolchain, making it hard to use other
compilers like clang [31] from the LLVM tool chain to build
the kernel. These are being fixed one patch at a time [32].
Our approach works with binary instructions and does not
depend on a specific compiler tool chain. Moreover compilers
will only be able to produce reduction from static analysis
methods. There is no room for reduction based on run time
behavior. We are able to take into consideration the run-time
behavior and make further reductions.
Binary specialization. Binary specialization techniques do
not require reconfiguring or rebuilding the kernel. They work
on the final kernel binary as is. KASR [5] specializes the ker-
nel binary using a VM-based approach wherein they trace all
the pages in the memory that are used by an application – for a
few iterations until the trace doesn’t change. This data is used
to mark the unused pages in the extended page tables as non-
executable, thus making the memory region unavailable to the
application. Face-Change [33], shadow kernels [34] create
specialized kernel text areas for each of the target applica-
tions and switch between them using a hypervisor to support
multiple applications running together. Their performance is
limited by the performance of the hypervisor. Face-Change
reported performance overheads approx. 40% for I/O bench-
marks and doesn’t support multithreading. KASR customizes
the kernel at a page level granularity. MULTIK has near na-
tive performance while customizing the kernel at basic-block
level granularity while supporting multithreading.
Kernel redesign. An orthogonal direction to specializing
general purposes kernels for attack surface reduction is to
use unikernels or microkernels that define a completely new
architecture. Unikernels [1] get rid of protection rings and
have the application code and the kernel in a single ring to
reduce performance overhead arising from context switches.
But this leaves kernel code that is required for the entire
system including boot and termination available to the appli-
cation. Microkernels such as Mach [35] design the kernel
in a very modular manner such that the kernel TCB is mini-
mal. This comes at the cost of performance overhead from
context switching. Moreover both these approaches require
the application to be re-built for the respective architectures.
NOOKS [36] redesigns the kernel to isolate device drives
from the kernel core – to protect from vulnerable device
drivers. It still leaves active a major part of the kernel (for
boot, shutdown and other OS tasks).
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9 Conclusion
MULTIK does not aim to provide the same level of isola-
tion as virtual machines(VM). Instead, it is a framework that
runs specialized kernel code without losing the flexibility of
integrating existing security mechanism to defend against
different cyber-threats e.g., data-only attacks. Our evaluation
shows that MULTIK can effectively reduce the kernel attack
surface while multiplexing multiple commodity/specialized
kernels with less than 1% overhead. MULTIK can be easily in-
tegrated with container-based software deployment to achieve
per-container kernels with no changes to the application.
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A Appendix
A.1 Docker Performance
Table 9 shows the performance evaluation when MULTIK is
integrated with Docker containers.
A.2 Redis and Gzip Benchmarks
Redis. We ran the redis-server (version 3.2.6) on the
specialized kernel and exercised the redis-benchmark with
default configuration on KERNEL0. The benchmark sends
10,0000 requests of each Redis command with 50 concurrent
clients and measures the number of requests serviced per sec-
ond. Table 10 shows that the requests per second for each
command, and that the Redis server running on both symbol-
and block-granularity kernels can achieve performance simi-
lar to that running on vanilla kernel for all tested commands
(<+/−1%).
gzip. We measure time spent in both kernel and user modes
to compress a randomly generated 512MB file with Gzip
1.6. Table 8 shows that gzip running on specialized kernels,
regardless of the trace granularity, has similar performance
compared to running on vanilla kernel.
A.3 Memory Effect
Figure 8 shows the memory effect with STREAM[14] in
a KVM instance with 2 VCPU and 4G RAM running on
Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E3-1270 v6 @ 3.80GHz.
A.4 ROP Gadget Attacks
We use two open-source tools, ROPgadget [37] and ROPPER
13, to measure the unique ROP gadgets found. Table 11 indi-
cates the reduced number of ROP gadget reported by these
two tools. ROPPER can find more gadgets than ROPGadget
by 3% to 6%. A reduction in the number of gadgets by itself
is not a good indicator for ROP attack evaluation because
attackers can still exploit the system if they can form chains
they need from the remaining gadgets [17]. We report these
reductions (Table 11) as a guide to system designers, but they
should be taken with a grain of salt. MULTIK can also be
coupled with CFI [17] to improve the protection of the system
from ROP attacks.
13https://github.com/sashs/Ropper
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Figure 8: STREAM benchmark with different numbers of coexist-
ing kernels.
Table 8: Time to compress a randomly generated 512MB file in
seconds with Gzip. The unit is seconds. Real refers to the wall
clock time. User refers to the amount of CPU time spent in user-
mode code within the process. Sys refers to the amount of CPU
time spent in kernel-mode code within the process. B, S refer to
kernel profiles generated by D-KUT with basic-block and symbol
granularities respectively. Green cells→ better performance (shorter
time to finish compression). Red cells→ worse performance (longer
time to finish compression).
Type Vanilla gzip-S gzip-B
real 10.049 10.05 -0.02% 10.088 -0.39%
user 9.56 9.58 -0.25% 9.648 -0.92%
sys 0.512 0.504 +1.56% 0.516 -0.78%
16
Table 9: Performance comparison between applications in docker containers on vanilla kernel and MULTIK + D-KUT. B, S refer to kernel
profiles generated by D-KUT with basic-block and symbol granularities respectively. For Apache, the higher number, the better performance.
For the others, the lower number, the better performance. Green cells→ better performance. Red cells→ worse performance.
Application Vanilla Symbol Block
Apache (req per sec) 13999.090 13988.560 -0.08% 13994.800 -0.03%
gzip a 512 MB file (sec) 11.062 11.052 +0.01% 11.022 +0.36%
perf bench sched messaging (sec) 0.192 0.192 0.00% 0.193 -0.52%
perf bench sched pipe (sec) 16.063 16.098 -0.22% 15.953 +0.68%
Table 10: Requests per second for each of the Redis commands. B, S refer to kernel profiles generated by D-KUT with basic-block and
symbol granularities respectively. Green cells→ better performance (more requests per second). Red cells→ worse performance (less requests
per second).
Benchmarks Vanilla Redis-S redis-B
PING_INLINE 398406.41 396825.38 -0.40% 398406.41 0.00%
PING_BULK 411522.62 409836.06 -0.41% 413223.16 +0.41%
SET 414937.75 418410.06 +0.84% 416666.69 +0.42%
GET 396825.38 398406.41 +0.40% 400000 +0.80%
INCR 416666.69 418410.06 +0.42% 414937.75 -0.41%
LPUSH 427350.44 429184.56 +0.43% 425531.91 -0.43%
RPUSH 416666.69 416666.69 0.00% 414937.75 -0.41%
LPOP 418410.06 420168.06 +0.42% 420168.06 +0.42%
RPOP 413223.16 416666.69 +0.83% 413223.16 0.00%
SADD 414937.75 418410.06 +0.84% 418410.06 +0.84%
SPOP 409836.06 409836.06 0.00% 408163.25 -0.41%
LPUSH 421940.94 421940.94 0.00% 423728.81 +0.42%
LRANGE_100 170068.03 170940.17 +0.51% 169491.53 -0.34%
LRANGE_300 41493.77 41101.52 -0.95% 41425.02 -0.17%
LRANGE_500 28490.03 28409.09 -0.28% 28522.53 +0.11%
LRANGE_600 21649.71 21523.89 -0.58% 21454.62 -0.90%
MSET 311526.47 310559 -0.31% 311526.47 0.00%
Geo Mean 241971.16 242334.95 +0.10% 242135.83 +0.02%
Table 11: ROP gadget reduction in comparison with the Vanilla Kernel. We measure the number of unique ROP gadgets and show the
percentage compared to the vanilla kernel. B, S refer to kernel profiles generated by D-KUT with basic-block and symbol granularities
respectively. SC refers to kernel profiles generated by S-KUT.
Specialized Kernel Apache-B Apache-S Apache-SC STREAM-B STREAM-S STREAM-SC perf-B perf-S perf-SC
ROPGadget 69.06% 65.63% 59.66% 72.32% 70.34% 63.55% 70.99% 68.71% 62.57%
ROPPER 72.25% 68.81% 63.08% 75.69% 73.62% 67.10% 74.33% 72.06% 66.15%
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